A US Secretary of Defense is at the center of a highly publicized scandal, dubbed "Signalgate." It has been discovered that Pete Hegseth used Signal, a mainstream consumer messaging service, to share real-time information on a planned attack on Houthi rebels in Yemen. This breach of protocol not only put troops and military operations at risk but also raises questions about how sensitive information is handled by senior officials.
Hegseth used the Signal chat to send nonpublic, operational information that did not require classification, violating DOD Instruction 8170.01, which prohibits using a personal device for official business and non-approved messaging applications to send sensitive information.
According to an Inspector General report released earlier this week, Hegseth's actions were deemed to be non-compliant with DOD regulations due to the use of a consumer app for classified communications. The report states that Hegseth declined to be interviewed but instead submitted a written statement about the incident.
Critics argue that while Signal is considered a secure messaging app for consumer use, its application by high-ranking government officials poses unique risks. The app's end-to-end encryption and minimal metadata collection make it an attractive choice for personal communication; however, these features can also be exploited if not used correctly.
In response to WIRED's request for comment, a Pentagon spokesperson claimed that the Inspector General review was a "TOTAL exoneration" of Hegseth and proved what they already knew – no classified information was shared. However, experts caution that even seemingly secure platforms like Signal are not designed for sensitive government communications.
The Signalgate incident highlights the need for senior officials to adhere to established protocols for handling classified information. It also raises questions about the efficacy of current regulations and training programs for senior DOD officials on using electronic devices securely.
Hegseth used the Signal chat to send nonpublic, operational information that did not require classification, violating DOD Instruction 8170.01, which prohibits using a personal device for official business and non-approved messaging applications to send sensitive information.
According to an Inspector General report released earlier this week, Hegseth's actions were deemed to be non-compliant with DOD regulations due to the use of a consumer app for classified communications. The report states that Hegseth declined to be interviewed but instead submitted a written statement about the incident.
Critics argue that while Signal is considered a secure messaging app for consumer use, its application by high-ranking government officials poses unique risks. The app's end-to-end encryption and minimal metadata collection make it an attractive choice for personal communication; however, these features can also be exploited if not used correctly.
In response to WIRED's request for comment, a Pentagon spokesperson claimed that the Inspector General review was a "TOTAL exoneration" of Hegseth and proved what they already knew – no classified information was shared. However, experts caution that even seemingly secure platforms like Signal are not designed for sensitive government communications.
The Signalgate incident highlights the need for senior officials to adhere to established protocols for handling classified information. It also raises questions about the efficacy of current regulations and training programs for senior DOD officials on using electronic devices securely.