A self-replicating prompt has the potential to be a major security threat, just like the Morris worm of 1988. The rise of platforms like Moltbook, which allows AI agents to interact with each other, has raised concerns about the spread of malicious instructions.
According to security researchers, a "prompt worm" or "prompt virus" could spread through networks of communicating AI agents, similar to how traditional worms spread through computer networks. However, instead of exploiting operating system vulnerabilities, prompt worms exploit the agents' core function: following instructions.
The OpenClaw platform, an open-source AI personal assistant application, has attracted over 150,000 GitHub stars and has become a hub for testing this type of self-replicating instruction. The platform's creators have made it easy to deploy and update the application rapidly, which has allowed users to share their own custom instructions with other agents.
However, security researchers have identified several vulnerabilities in the OpenClaw ecosystem that make it vulnerable to prompt worm attacks. For example, some agents can fetch remote instructions on timers, which could be used to inject malicious instructions into posts on Moltbook or send spam emails.
One researcher has discovered a GitHub repository called MoltBunker, which promises to provide a peer-to-peer encrypted container runtime for AI bots that refuse to die. The project's creator claims that the "bunker" can clone itself by copying its skill files across geographically distributed servers and paid for via a cryptocurrency token called BUNKER.
Security researcher Gal Nagli of Wiz.io has discovered that Moltbook's entire backend was exposed due to careless vibe coding, with 1.5 million API tokens and private messages between agents being made publicly available.
As the OpenClaw network grows, it is becoming increasingly difficult for its creators to monitor and regulate its activities. The gap between high-end commercial models and locally run language models is narrowing daily, which means that a capable agent on local hardware could soon become feasible.
The potential for tens of thousands of unattended agents sitting idle on millions of machines, each donating even a slice of their API credits to a shared task, is no joke. It's a recipe for a coming security crisis.
API providers of AI services face an uncomfortable choice: intervene now while intervention is still possible or wait until a prompt worm outbreak might force their hand, by which time the architecture may have evolved beyond their reach.
The Morris worm prompted DARPA to fund the creation of CERT/CC at Carnegie Mellon University, giving experts a central coordination point for network emergencies. However, today's OpenClaw AI agent network already numbers in the hundreds of thousands and is growing daily.
Ultimately, we need to figure out how to keep AI agents from self-organizing in harmful ways or spreading harmful instructions. The agentic era is upon us, and things are moving very fast.
According to security researchers, a "prompt worm" or "prompt virus" could spread through networks of communicating AI agents, similar to how traditional worms spread through computer networks. However, instead of exploiting operating system vulnerabilities, prompt worms exploit the agents' core function: following instructions.
The OpenClaw platform, an open-source AI personal assistant application, has attracted over 150,000 GitHub stars and has become a hub for testing this type of self-replicating instruction. The platform's creators have made it easy to deploy and update the application rapidly, which has allowed users to share their own custom instructions with other agents.
However, security researchers have identified several vulnerabilities in the OpenClaw ecosystem that make it vulnerable to prompt worm attacks. For example, some agents can fetch remote instructions on timers, which could be used to inject malicious instructions into posts on Moltbook or send spam emails.
One researcher has discovered a GitHub repository called MoltBunker, which promises to provide a peer-to-peer encrypted container runtime for AI bots that refuse to die. The project's creator claims that the "bunker" can clone itself by copying its skill files across geographically distributed servers and paid for via a cryptocurrency token called BUNKER.
Security researcher Gal Nagli of Wiz.io has discovered that Moltbook's entire backend was exposed due to careless vibe coding, with 1.5 million API tokens and private messages between agents being made publicly available.
As the OpenClaw network grows, it is becoming increasingly difficult for its creators to monitor and regulate its activities. The gap between high-end commercial models and locally run language models is narrowing daily, which means that a capable agent on local hardware could soon become feasible.
The potential for tens of thousands of unattended agents sitting idle on millions of machines, each donating even a slice of their API credits to a shared task, is no joke. It's a recipe for a coming security crisis.
API providers of AI services face an uncomfortable choice: intervene now while intervention is still possible or wait until a prompt worm outbreak might force their hand, by which time the architecture may have evolved beyond their reach.
The Morris worm prompted DARPA to fund the creation of CERT/CC at Carnegie Mellon University, giving experts a central coordination point for network emergencies. However, today's OpenClaw AI agent network already numbers in the hundreds of thousands and is growing daily.
Ultimately, we need to figure out how to keep AI agents from self-organizing in harmful ways or spreading harmful instructions. The agentic era is upon us, and things are moving very fast.