Liverpool's summer spending spree of £424m (£550m) has left fans wondering what was supposed to be achieved. With their disappointing form at the start of this season, it's difficult to pinpoint exactly what went wrong.
The club was close to landing Crystal Palace centre-back Marc Guéhi for an additional £40m, which could have provided a vital option in defence and allowed Arne Slot to rest Ibrahima Konaté. However, the partnership between Konaté and Virgil van Dijk has been less effective this season than it was in previous campaigns.
Slot's tactics this season seem to be focused on returning to last season's midfield structure, with a return to 10 outfield players from the previous campaign. This approach, however, seems to have made Liverpool vulnerable to direct balls played behind their full-backs. The decision to stick with this strategy appears to have been an acknowledgment that too much change was attempted in the summer.
Soccer teams are complex organisms, and even on a purely tactical level, changing one element of a lineup has an impact on the other 10 elements. Removing Trent Alexander-Arnold from the team would render Liverpool without a player who can naturally invert to become an auxiliary holding midfielder.
Slot had become convinced that opponents had worked out Liverpool's tactics by the end of last season and decided to make significant changes this summer. While some change was inevitable, it remains unclear what Slot intended with his approach.
The club signed two centre-forwards – Alexander Isak and Hugo Ekitike – for a combined fee of £210m (£276m), providing an unusually privileged position. However, the question is where Florian Wirtz, who cost £100m plus add-ons, was supposed to fit into the team.
Wirtz's role was initially seen as a central creator in a 4-2-3-1, but this approach left Liverpool exposed at the back. With Wirtz struggling to cope with the physicality of the Premier League, it's hard to see how he and Mohamed Salah can play together without risking midfield overwhelm.
The only possible explanation for Liverpool's recruitment strategy is that they aimed to create a 4-3-1-2 system, with Wirtz playing behind Alexander Isak and Ekitike. However, this plan seems unworkable unless the team adopts a more direct approach, reminiscent of the 1980s English game.
For now, Liverpool stand as a cautionary tale of how throwing money at a good team can make things worse.
The club was close to landing Crystal Palace centre-back Marc Guéhi for an additional £40m, which could have provided a vital option in defence and allowed Arne Slot to rest Ibrahima Konaté. However, the partnership between Konaté and Virgil van Dijk has been less effective this season than it was in previous campaigns.
Slot's tactics this season seem to be focused on returning to last season's midfield structure, with a return to 10 outfield players from the previous campaign. This approach, however, seems to have made Liverpool vulnerable to direct balls played behind their full-backs. The decision to stick with this strategy appears to have been an acknowledgment that too much change was attempted in the summer.
Soccer teams are complex organisms, and even on a purely tactical level, changing one element of a lineup has an impact on the other 10 elements. Removing Trent Alexander-Arnold from the team would render Liverpool without a player who can naturally invert to become an auxiliary holding midfielder.
Slot had become convinced that opponents had worked out Liverpool's tactics by the end of last season and decided to make significant changes this summer. While some change was inevitable, it remains unclear what Slot intended with his approach.
The club signed two centre-forwards – Alexander Isak and Hugo Ekitike – for a combined fee of £210m (£276m), providing an unusually privileged position. However, the question is where Florian Wirtz, who cost £100m plus add-ons, was supposed to fit into the team.
Wirtz's role was initially seen as a central creator in a 4-2-3-1, but this approach left Liverpool exposed at the back. With Wirtz struggling to cope with the physicality of the Premier League, it's hard to see how he and Mohamed Salah can play together without risking midfield overwhelm.
The only possible explanation for Liverpool's recruitment strategy is that they aimed to create a 4-3-1-2 system, with Wirtz playing behind Alexander Isak and Ekitike. However, this plan seems unworkable unless the team adopts a more direct approach, reminiscent of the 1980s English game.
For now, Liverpool stand as a cautionary tale of how throwing money at a good team can make things worse.