The UK's Double Game in Sudan and Somalia Exposes Credibility Gap
The British government has been accused of playing a double game in its handling of conflicts in Sudan and Somalia. On one hand, officials have expressed concerns about atrocities committed by the Sudanese army and Rapid Support Forces (RSF), urging accountability for mass-scale death and devastation. However, behind the scenes, London's actions suggest a more nuanced strategy that prioritizes economic interests over diplomatic pressure.
In Sudan, internal documents reveal that the UK government opted for a low-key approach to ending the bloodshed, even as RSF atrocities mounted in Darfur. This stance has led analysts to question whether the UK is genuinely committed to brokering peace or merely seeking to maintain its influence in the region. Amgad Fareid Eltayeb, a Sudanese policy analyst, notes that the UK's credibility is increasingly judged by the risks it is willing to take.
Critics argue that London's handling of Somalia also exposes a similar lack of consistency. Officially backing the territorial integrity of Somalia while engaging in commercial dealings with Somaliland, a region not recognized as part of Somalia by the international community, raises eyebrows. The strategic port of Berbera sits at the heart of this controversy, as it offers a crucial maritime link between the Red Sea and the Indian Ocean.
Analysts suggest that the UK's entanglement in Berbera is part of a broader Emirati logistics network linked to alleged supply routes used to arm the RSF. This has led to concerns about London's commercial interests potentially undermining its diplomatic efforts. Abdulfath Hamed Ali, an independent Horn of Africa analyst, notes that this creates a "gap between principle and practice" for the UK.
The situation is further complicated by Somaliland's growing recognition as an independent state by countries like Israel, which has been met with condemnation from Mogadishu and the international community. This highlights how economic engagement can become intertwined with politics, making it difficult to sustain claims that such ties are separate.
In both Sudan and Somalia, critics argue that the UK's approach reflects a single strategy: preserving access and partnerships while avoiding moves that would narrow its room for manoeuvre. While this may secure short-term influence, analysts warn that it carries longer-term costs, particularly in regions like the Horn of Africa where allegiances are complex and rivalries abound.
The implications of this double game are far-reaching. If local actors begin to view London's incentives as lying elsewhere, the UK risks losing moral authority to press for political compromise. In the Horn, where alliances overlap with regional rivalries, mixed signals can quickly become a liability. As Amgad Fareid Eltayeb cautions, "You lose the moral authority to press for political compromise if local actors think your incentives lie elsewhere."
The British government has been accused of playing a double game in its handling of conflicts in Sudan and Somalia. On one hand, officials have expressed concerns about atrocities committed by the Sudanese army and Rapid Support Forces (RSF), urging accountability for mass-scale death and devastation. However, behind the scenes, London's actions suggest a more nuanced strategy that prioritizes economic interests over diplomatic pressure.
In Sudan, internal documents reveal that the UK government opted for a low-key approach to ending the bloodshed, even as RSF atrocities mounted in Darfur. This stance has led analysts to question whether the UK is genuinely committed to brokering peace or merely seeking to maintain its influence in the region. Amgad Fareid Eltayeb, a Sudanese policy analyst, notes that the UK's credibility is increasingly judged by the risks it is willing to take.
Critics argue that London's handling of Somalia also exposes a similar lack of consistency. Officially backing the territorial integrity of Somalia while engaging in commercial dealings with Somaliland, a region not recognized as part of Somalia by the international community, raises eyebrows. The strategic port of Berbera sits at the heart of this controversy, as it offers a crucial maritime link between the Red Sea and the Indian Ocean.
Analysts suggest that the UK's entanglement in Berbera is part of a broader Emirati logistics network linked to alleged supply routes used to arm the RSF. This has led to concerns about London's commercial interests potentially undermining its diplomatic efforts. Abdulfath Hamed Ali, an independent Horn of Africa analyst, notes that this creates a "gap between principle and practice" for the UK.
The situation is further complicated by Somaliland's growing recognition as an independent state by countries like Israel, which has been met with condemnation from Mogadishu and the international community. This highlights how economic engagement can become intertwined with politics, making it difficult to sustain claims that such ties are separate.
In both Sudan and Somalia, critics argue that the UK's approach reflects a single strategy: preserving access and partnerships while avoiding moves that would narrow its room for manoeuvre. While this may secure short-term influence, analysts warn that it carries longer-term costs, particularly in regions like the Horn of Africa where allegiances are complex and rivalries abound.
The implications of this double game are far-reaching. If local actors begin to view London's incentives as lying elsewhere, the UK risks losing moral authority to press for political compromise. In the Horn, where alliances overlap with regional rivalries, mixed signals can quickly become a liability. As Amgad Fareid Eltayeb cautions, "You lose the moral authority to press for political compromise if local actors think your incentives lie elsewhere."