US Cyber Command's alleged involvement in a "precise" cyber attack on Venezuela's electricity grid, which left parts of the capital city Caracas without power for an extended period, is shrouded in mystery.
Details are scarce, but unnamed US officials claim that the operation allowed US military helicopters to move undetected into the country as part of a mission to capture President Nicolás Maduro. The paper suggests that the cyberattack was able to turn off electricity for just a few minutes in most residential areas of Caracas, but left some neighborhoods without power for three days.
The lack of information on the methods used by US Cyber Command to execute this attack is particularly noteworthy. A comparison with Russia's 2015 BlackEnergy malware attack can be drawn, which similarly targeted corporate networks before penetrating supervisory control and data acquisition systems, causing widespread power outages. However, Russia's attackers also exploited legitimate functionality in their malicious endeavor.
This Venezuela cyberattack shares some similarities with Industroyer (or Crash Override), a sophisticated piece of malware used against Ukraine's power grid nearly a year ago. The key difference is that the latter specifically targeted electric grid systems directly. Industry experts have pointed out that the lack of detailed information on the alleged US operation raises doubts about its authenticity.
Furthermore, Venezuela's government attributes the power outage to US missiles, and an unverified video circulating online purports to show damage to a substation. This has led some to question whether the cyberattack was actually carried out by the US or if it's simply an example of a plausible explanation for a real phenomenon.
The implications of using cyberattacks on power grids are significant. Hospitals and other critical infrastructure can be severely affected, putting civilians at risk. While the New York Times highlights the precision and effectiveness of US cyber capabilities in this alleged operation, the lack of concrete evidence means that it's premature to draw definitive conclusions.
Details are scarce, but unnamed US officials claim that the operation allowed US military helicopters to move undetected into the country as part of a mission to capture President Nicolás Maduro. The paper suggests that the cyberattack was able to turn off electricity for just a few minutes in most residential areas of Caracas, but left some neighborhoods without power for three days.
The lack of information on the methods used by US Cyber Command to execute this attack is particularly noteworthy. A comparison with Russia's 2015 BlackEnergy malware attack can be drawn, which similarly targeted corporate networks before penetrating supervisory control and data acquisition systems, causing widespread power outages. However, Russia's attackers also exploited legitimate functionality in their malicious endeavor.
This Venezuela cyberattack shares some similarities with Industroyer (or Crash Override), a sophisticated piece of malware used against Ukraine's power grid nearly a year ago. The key difference is that the latter specifically targeted electric grid systems directly. Industry experts have pointed out that the lack of detailed information on the alleged US operation raises doubts about its authenticity.
Furthermore, Venezuela's government attributes the power outage to US missiles, and an unverified video circulating online purports to show damage to a substation. This has led some to question whether the cyberattack was actually carried out by the US or if it's simply an example of a plausible explanation for a real phenomenon.
The implications of using cyberattacks on power grids are significant. Hospitals and other critical infrastructure can be severely affected, putting civilians at risk. While the New York Times highlights the precision and effectiveness of US cyber capabilities in this alleged operation, the lack of concrete evidence means that it's premature to draw definitive conclusions.